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RESURRECTING THE PRESS CLAUSE
David A. Anderson
In recent decades, the Press Clause has been no more than an invisible force in 
constitutional law, influencing interpretation of the speech clause but having no 
independent effect of its own.   In the early years of First Amendment jurisprudence the 
Supreme Court often relied explicitly on the Press Clause as the source of press rights.  
But for the past thirty or forty years, the Court has refused to give the Press Clause any 
significance independent of the speech clause.  When faced with claims based on 
freedom of the press, the Court usually interpreted the speech clause broadly enough to 
protect the claimed right, and when that was not possible – when rights were claimed that 
could not be made available to all speakers – the court denied them.  
This strategy in most instances caused no serious harm to the interests of a free 
press.  Rights shared with the public at large were just as useful as press-specific rights, 
and they deflected the resentments that the latter might have generated.  Well-financed 
media litigants pursing their own interests won free speech rights for others who might 
have lacked the interest or resources to win them on their own.  In the few instances in 
which the Court rejected press claims, the media were often able to secure passage of 
legislation that gave them at least as much protection as the failed constitutional claim 
would have provided. 
2Now, however, the Court has embarked on a course that makes it more difficult to 
avoid the question of special constitutional protection for the press.  In a series of cases 
culminating this term in McConnell v. the Federal Election Commission, the Court has 
held that Congress can restrict the political speech of corporations.1 The decision upheld  
key provisions of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance bill, known officially as the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).  Corporations are now forbidden to pay 
directly2 for “electioneering communications” and may not promote their political views 
indirectly through contributions to political parties.  The prohibitions extend even to 
nonprofit corporations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Rifle 
Association.3
The prohibitions against expenditures and contributions apply to media 
companies too, but because news, commentary, and editorials are exempted, the 
restrictions give media corporations a political advantage over nonmedia corporations.  
“Media companies can run procandidate editorials as easily as nonmedia corporations can 
pay for advertisements.”4  Before McConnell, this disparity was not dramatic because the 
legislation upheld by earlier decisions only prohibited direct corporate contributions to 
candidates, leaving corporations free to promote their political views by buying ads and 
1
 The restrictions apply also to labor unions, and some of them also limit wealthy individuals.  For 
simplicity’s sake I use “speech of corporations” or “corporate speech” to refer to all the entities to which 
the restrictions apply. 
2
 They are still permitted to form Political Action Committees for these purposes, but they may not use 
funds from the corporate or union treasury.  
3
 The Court held that the legislation must be construed to exempt certain voluntary organizations that exist 
purely to engage in political advocacy.   As defined by Massachusetts Committee for Life, 479 U.S. 238 
(1986), this subset is limited to nonprofits that were formed for the purpose of political advocacy, do not 
engage in business activities, were not formed by businesses or unions and do not accept contributions from 
them, and have no shareholders.  124 S.Ct. at 699. 
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 740, Thomas, J. dissenting.
3giving money to political parties and like-minded committees.  But the BCRA closes 
those avenues of political expression for virtually all corporations (including media 
corporations), while leaving the media free to proselytize without restriction through their 
editorials and even news columns.  Justice Kennedy alleged that McConnell “is the 
codification of an assumption that the mainstream media alone can protect freedom of
speech.”
McConnell invites two kinds of Press Clause claims.  One kind are the challenges 
that will arise, from entities that are undeniably press, if Congress or the state legislatures 
attempt to impose new regulations on the political speech of media.  Legislators might do 
this to reduce the media-nonmedia disparity that McConnell ratifies, or they might do it 
simply because they are emboldened by the message that they have considerable power 
to limit speech in the interest of curtailing the advantages of wealth in politics.  
The second kind of Press Clause claims will come from entities that do not 
qualify for the press exemptions in the legislation but contend that they are “press” within 
the meaning of the Press Clause and therefore cannot be subjected to the regulations.  Not 
surprisingly, nonmedia corporations are said to be exploring ways of availing themselves 
of the press exceptions – by starting or purchasing newspapers or broadcast stations, for 
example.  If Congress or the courts attempt to prevent such circumventions by 
distinguishing somehow between “real” news media and those that exist primarily to 
promote the political views of the parent corporation, some of those denied exemption 
4will surely advance claims that they are being denied freedom of the press.  Indeed, the 
McConnell litigation itself included such a claim.
Unless the Court is prepared to hold that freedom of the press does not include the 
right to try to influence elections, it will be difficult to deny some of those claims.  
Because many newspapers, magazines, and broadcast outlets today are owned by 
conglomerates that also have nonmedia holdings, there is no easy distinction between 
“true” media and media that are mouthpieces for nonmedia corporations.  It may be even 
harder to reject the free press claims of nonprofit corporations, some of which already 
have well-established media outlets that seem to be indistinguishable from competing 
outlets that are indisputably “the press.”5
In the past the Court avoided difficulties like these by construing the speech 
clause broadly enough to obviate the need to single out the press.  The dissenters in 
McConnell urged that result this time too.  All four of them warned that the majority’s 
refusal to construe the speech clause broadly enough to protect corporate speech would 
have far reaching implications for the role of the press.  The majority refused to do so 
because it was convinced that unlimited corporate spending threatened the integrity of 
American politics.  I agree with that premise and with the Court’s decision, and I 
therefore do not fault the Court for refusing to give corporations a First Amendment right 
to pay for “electioneering communications” and fund the political parties.  But the 
legislation upheld by the decision sets up such a wide disparity between the political 
5
 E.g., the Nation magazine, the St. Petersburg Times newspaper, and the Texas Observer, are all widely 
recognized as independent voices of political journalism and are all owned by nonprofit foundations.  
5power of media and nonmedia corporations that it seems certain to force the Court to 
eventually decide two weighty First Amendment questions:  Can the political speech of 
media be regulated?  If not, is it the Press Clause that precludes it?  
I.  The Press Clause in the early years  
“Early” is a relative term here, since the Supreme Court did not begin to make 
First Amendment law until well into the twentieth century.  In the first twenty or thirty 
years of that development, the Court seemed to take the Press Clause seriously.  Many of 
the great press victories were based explicitly on the Press Clause.  The Court said it was 
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press that protected newspapers from prior 
restraints on publication,6 prevented discriminatory taxation of newspapers,7 allowed 
pamphleteers to distribute their writings without a permit,8 and protected editors’ freedom 
to editorialize about elections.9
In retrospect, these early cases seem both natural and naïve.  The claimants 
asserting First Amendment rights were clearly press by any definition, so why shouldn’t 
their claims be addressed under the Press Clause?  It would have seemed unnatural then if 
the Court had chosen to treat them as speech clause claims.  At the same time, it appears 
that the potential problem of deciding who qualifies as press never occurred to the Court. 
[elaborate].
6
 Near v. Minnesota.
7
 Grosjean v. American Press Co.
8
 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
9
 Mills v. Alabama.
6Gradually that reliance on the Press Clause gave way to less specific attributions, 
such as “freedom of speech and press” or “freedom of expression”.   In some instances 
this may have occurred because press claims and those of nonpress speakers were being 
decided in the same case.  In Bridges v. California, for example, the Court struck down 
contempt citations against the Los Angeles Times and the labor leader Harry Bridges in 
the same opinion; New York Times v. Sullivan reversed libel judgments against not only 
the Times, but also four individual defendants.  Eventually, however, the Court came to 
eschew reliance on the Press Clause even when the claim involved only the press.10
This abandonment of the Press Clause as a specific source of constitutional 
authority had no immediate consequences, because the Court gave the press whatever 
rights it recognized under the speech clause and the press asked no more.  But in the 
1970s the press began asserting claims that could only be accepted if the First 
Amendment gave the press rights that it did not give all speakers.  These included claims 
that journalists had First Amendment rights to interview prisoners11 and resist 
subpoenas12 and search warrants.13  Whether the Press Clause created rights different 
from those based on the speech clause for the first time became an issue that had to be 
decided.   
10Craig, Pennekamp, Hill
11
 Pell, Saxbe, Houchins.
12
 Branzburg v. Hayes, 
13
 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
7Justice Stewart argued that it did.  He first advanced the argument in 1972 in a 
dissenting opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes.  The issue in that case was whether the First 
Amendment gave journalists a right to refuse to disclose confidential sources – or, as the 
majority put it, “require[d] a privileged position for them.”  Although Stewart discussed 
at length the constitutionally protected role of the press, he did not explicitly ascribe 
independent significance to the Press Clause.  Indeed, he seemed at pains to ground his 
argument in more diffuse notions of the First Amendment:
As I see it, a reporter’s right to protect his source is bottomed on the constitutional 
guarantee of a full flow of information to the public.  A newsman’s personal First 
Amendment rights or the associational rights of the newsman and the source are 
subsumed under that broad societal interest protected by the First Amendment.  
Obviously, we are not here concerned with the parochial personal concerns of 
particular newsmen or informants.14
Nonetheless, it was clear he believed that the First Amendment gave the press rights 
different from those of other speakers: his proposed solution to the confidential source 
problem was to create a qualified testimonial privilege available to persons he described 
as “reporters” or “newsmen.”15
Two years later, Stewart explicitly embraced the Press Clause as a source of 
special protection for the press.   In an off-the-bench speech that attracted great deal of 
14
 Branzburg at 726 n. 2.
15
 Banzburg at 743.
8attention, he argued that “the Free Press Clause extends to “the publishing business” an 
institutional protection different from that of other Bill of Rights guarantees, including 
the speech clause.  He argued that the Founders distinguished between freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press and intended “the constitutional guarantee of a free press . . . to 
create a fourth institution outside government as an additional check on the three official 
branches.” 
The Court seemed to take that view, at least in dicta, in a decision issued a few 
months before Stewart spoke.  The case was Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo; 
the issue was whether a state could constitutionally require a newspaper to give a right of 
reply to a political candidate it had attacked.  The Court’s answer was no; the costs to the 
newspaper of providing the space and composing time to print the reply would penalize it 
for having attacked the candidate, which would tend to deter editors from publishing 
material that might trigger the right-of-reply.  Such a content-based penalty would be 
contrary to general First Amendment principles – a rationale that required no extra 
protection for the press.  But the Court added another paragraph:
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compulsory 
access law and would not be forced to forgo publication or news or opinion by the 
inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First 
Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors.  A newspaper is 
more than a passive receptacle for conduit for news, comment, and advertising.  
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to 
9limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and 
public officials -- whether fair or unfair – constitute the exercise of editorial 
control and judgment.  It has yet to be demonstrated how government regulation 
of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with the First Amendment 
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.
This explicit resort to the guarantees of a free press, and more importantly, the suggestion 
that the First Amendment protected editorial control and judgment from governmental 
intrusion into the function of editors, seemed to confirm Stewart’s view.  The proposition 
that the Press Clause protects editorial judgment has become a central tenet for some who 
claim a distinct role for the Press Clause.
II.  Abandoning the Press Clause 
But 1974, the year of Tornillo and Stewart’s speech, turned out to be the apogee 
of the independent life of the Press Clause.  The Court did not develop an independent 
Press Clause jurisprudence.  Indeed, it went out of its way to avoid doing so.  The Court 
responded to constitutional claims by the press in one of two ways.  Whenever possible, 
the Court interpreted the speech clause broadly enough to sustain the press claim, thereby 
obviating the need to rely on the Press Clause.  When that was not possible, the Court 
rejected the claim. 
10
The determination to base protections on the speech clause whenever possible had 
many salutary effects.  In defamation cases, by basing the constitutional protections on 
the speech clause rather than the Press Clause, the Court made them available to speakers 
generally, not just the press.  Although the history that the Court relied on in New York 
Times v. Sullivan was primarily the historical use of libel law to suppress the press, the 
Court’s decision was not limited to the Times, but applied equally to four individuals 
sued separately for having prepared (bought?) the ad over which the Times was sued.  In 
a subsequent libel decisions the Court occasionally employed rhetoric suggesting that 
nonpress speakers might be less fully protected,16 but in fact it has never failed to give 
them the same treatment as media defendants.  The result is that the constitutional law of 
defamation gives media no advantage over other participants in public discussion.  The 
same is true of constitutional limitations on other torts, such as privacy and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.
Sometimes, however, the Court’s determination to rest protections on the speech 
clause rather than the Press Clause forced it to adopt unconvincing fictions.  When faced 
with press claims for a constitutional right of access to judicial proceedings, the court 
responded by recognizing a public right of access instead.   The public was not seeking 
access to courtrooms, of course, and could not be widely accommodated if it did.  The 
Court recognized this, and even advised that it would be permissible to exclude members 
of the public in order to make room for the press, but insisted nonetheless that the right it 
was recognizing was that of the public rather than the press.  
16
 (D&B, Gertz, Hepps),
11
In that context, the impulse to avoid preferential treatment for the press produced 
only a harmless and transparent fiction. In others, however, it can produce analytical 
confusion.  The Court’s cases on differential taxation of media illustrate this.  Initially 
these cases clearly relied on the Press Clause.  The first of them, Grosjean, was easy.  
The Louisiana legislature had imposed a two per cent tax on newspapers’gross receipts 
from advertising, but exempted all papers with less than 20,000 circulation.  Its purpose 
was generally understood to be to punish the 13 largest newspapers in the state, all but 
one of  which opposed Senator Huey Long, without burdening the smaller newspapers, 
most of which supported him.  Indeed, Long’s own literature called it “a tax on lying, 2 
cents per lie.”  The Court reviewed at length the of use of taxation throughout history to 
suppress the press or segments thereof, and concluded that the tax in question had “the 
plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected 
group of newspapers.”17  It was unconstitutional “because it abridges the freedom of the 
press.”
The subsequent cases, the Court elaborated and extended the theory that the 
history of the Press Clause required special scrutiny of differential taxation of media. 
[More on Minneapolis Star, Arkansas Writers,]  
For reasons that are not clear, the Court eventually backed away from the 
straightforward notion that the Press Clause precluded discriminatory taxation of the 
press.  In Leathers, the Court reinterpreted the press taxation cases in terms of 
discrimination against speakers.   Referring to Grosjean, Minnealpolis Star, and 
17
 Grosjean at 251.
12
Arkansas Writers, the Court said “These cases demonstrate that differential taxation of 
First Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the 
expression of particular ideas or viewpoints.”18
“Differential taxation of speakers” is a difficult concept to understand.  All 
taxpayers are speakers; to say they can’t be differentially taxed is to say taxes must apply 
uniformly to everyone.  But the Court has repeatedly rejected that proposition and did so 
again in Leathers, opining that “Inherent in the power to tax is the power to discriminate 
in taxation.”   So the phrase must refer to taxation of speakers qua speakers .  But that is a 
problematical concept too.  Unless one posits an omnipresent tax collector – one who can 
collect the tax whenever someone speaks, a “tax on speech” could not be administered.  
A tax on speech about specified subjects, or speech expressing specified views, would be 
subject to the same administrative difficulty, and would be subject to the further objection 
that the government may not penalize speech on the basis of its content or viewpoint.
As a practical matter, the only way the legislature can differentially tax speakers 
is by categorizing them according to tangible indicia that enable the tax collector to 
determine who owes the tax and who does not.  The only obvious tangible means of 
classification is the medium by which the speech is communicated.  The shift in Leathers 
to the speech clause makes sense only if the Court means to extend the constitutional 
limitations on differential taxation to nonpress media – i.e., to hold that in addition to the 
anti-discrimination principles that apply to the press because of the Press Clause, the 
speech clause limits discrimination among other media.   
18
 Leathers at 447
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One might suppose the Court thought this necessary because the complaining 
taxpayers in Leathers -- cable television operators – were not press.  If they were not, the 
previous taxation cases would not provide a basis for holding that the cable operators 
could not be discriminated against.  But that explanation fails, for two reasons.  First, the 
Court did not hold that the press cases were inapplicable to cable; on the contrary, it said 
cable television “is, in much of its operation, part of the ‘press.’”  It treated the press tax 
cases as relevant precedents, although it expanded the analysis to also include similar 
First Amendment claims by nonpress organizations.  Second, it did not hold the 
discrimination against cable unconstitutional. It upheld the tax discrimination, not only as 
to intermedia discrimination between cable and print media, but also as to intramedia 
discrimination between cable and satellite services.  Although it might have been 
necessary to create a new speech-clause-based principle to invalidate the tax 
discrimination against cable, it obviously was not necessary to do so to uphold it.  If the 
Court believed the previous cases did not create a principle broad enough to cover cable, 
that by itself would have been a sufficient basis for the decision.
We are left, then, with no explanation for Leathers except that the Court wished to 
back away from the clear reliance on the Press Clause in the earlier cases and explain 
those results in speech clause terms.  But those are not readily explainable as speech 
clause cases.  Here is an instance where the Court’s zeal to avoid reliance on the Press 
Clause led it into an untenable, if not incoherent, rationale.
14
Another case in which the analysis could have been more straightforward had the 
Court been willing to use the Press Clause is Bartnicki v. Vopper.  The question was 
whether a radio station could be held liable for broadcasting a private cellular phone 
conversation that it knew had been recorded in violation of state and federal wiretap laws.   
The relevant statutes forbade not only the illegal recording but also intentional disclosure 
thereof, and contained no exception for disclosures by news media.  The defendants were 
clearly liable unless the First Amendment protected them.  They argued that the press has 
a right to publish even stolen information if it concerns a matter of public importance, but 
the Court refused to consider any special right for the press.  Instead, it adopted a 
rationale that required it to perform contortions, both analytical and factual.  
Although it conceded that the wiretap statutes were content-neutral, the Court 
subjected them to the strict scrutiny normally reserved for content-based regulations.  It 
held that the statutes could not be applied to the defendants absent a “need of the highest 
order” – the test that was developed in Daily Mail, Landmark Communications, and 
Florida Star for statutes that punished speech because of its content.  It then held that 
neither the government’s interest in discouraging third parties’ use of illegally taped 
conversations nor its interest in protecting the privacy of telephone conversations was  
sufficient to justify application of the wiretap statutes to disclosures about matters of 
public concern by defendants who had nothing to do with the illegal interception.  That 
formulation of the controlling principle then forced the Court into a factual contortion:  
characterization of private telephone conversations as “debate about matters of public 
concern.”  Unpersuasive as this reasoning may be, it enabled the Court to protect the 
15
media defendants in that case (and perhaps more important, the New York Times in 
another similar case pending at the time Bartnicki was decided), without creating a 
specific rule for the press.  
These objections to Leathers and Bartnicki are largely aesthetic, however.  Up to 
this point, the Court’s determination to avoid the Press Clause has done little real harm to 
the interests of a free press.  The press’s objections to newsroom searches were valid and 
compelling, but the Court’s refusal to treat them as a First Amendment problem proved to 
be inconsequential.   Congress and many state legislatures promptly passed statutes 
severely restricting newsroom searches, and the problem has pretty much disappeared.  
The Court’s failure to adopt a First Amendment privilege to prevent compelled 
disclosure of reporters’ confidential sources has had consequences, but not as dire as 
might have been expected.  One reason is that here too legislatures stepped into the 
breach:  more than half of the states now have shield statutes, some of them creating 
broader protection than the First Amendment privilege the Court was asked to create in 
Branzburg.  It is said that Congress was ready to enact a federal shield statute if media 
had been able to agree on the scope of protection they wanted.  A second reason is that 
most federal courts, and a considerable number of state courts, have recognized some sort 
of First Amendment privilege despite Branzburg.  Those courts limit Branzburg to its 
setting – reporters refusing to testify before grand juries – and adopt a privilege like the 
one rejected in Branzburg for other types of proceedings, such as criminal and civil trials.   
16
The Court’s refusal to use the Press Clause to protect confidentiality of news 
sources was followed by a great deal of litigation, but how much of that would have been 
avoided had the Court decided otherwise is far from clear.  The issues being litigated 
generally have to do with who may claim the privilege and how much information the 
privilege covers – issues that would not have disappeared had the Court recognized a 
First Amendment privilege.  And just as the media have lobbied legislatures for ever 
broader protection, so might they have pressed the Court for expansion of whatever 
privilege the Court might have created in Branzburg.  
The one area in which the Court’s rejection of Press Clause claims has had 
important lasting consequences is lack of access to prisons (and perhaps, by logical 
extension, to other public facilities to which press access is limited).  The press’s 
unsuccessful attempts to create a constitutional right of access seem to have resulted in 
some softening of prison rules restricting press access, but there has been no significant 
legislative response to the problem.  It is impossible to know, of course, how much this 
has curtailed news coverage of prisons.  It seems clear that the coverage since the mid-
1970s has not kept pace with the burgeoning prison population over that period, but this 
might reflect public (or press) indifference to prison conditions rather than inability to 
gain access.  If the Court had recognized a constitutional right of access to state prisons, 
as it was asked to do in Houchins, and federal prisons as it was asked to do in Saxbe, that 
would not necessarily have guaranteed access to those being held in military custody in 
the aftermath of 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq, but it at least might have provided a basis 
for the press to litigate that issue.  In the absence of either a constitutional or statutory 
17
right of access, the press has no clear legal ground to challenge the administration’s no-
access policies.
So far the Court has been able to avoid reliance on the Press Clause.  It has been 
able to avoid giving the press explicitly preferential treatment under the speech clause, 
although the press has been de facto the chief beneficiary of the courtroom access cases, 
the Bartnicki case, and the defamation cases. 
III.  The Campaign Finance cases
Members of the Court recognized early on that regulating the funding of political 
campaigns could raise prickly questions about the political speech of the press.  
Reluctance to raise such questions clearly played a role in the Court’s decision in First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.  The Court held that a state statute forbidding 
expenditures by business corporations to influence the outcome of referenda violated the 
First Amendment.  Although the court acknowledged that the press has a “special and 
constitutionally recognized role” in informing the public,19 limiting the right  to influence 
referenda to corporate members of the institutional press “would not be responsive to the 
informational purpose of the First Amendment.”20
In a long concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger said failure to protect the 
speech expenditures of the bank would also threaten the First Amendment rights of “the 
19
 Belloti at 781
20
 Belloti at fn. 18
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large media conglomerates . . . because of the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of 
distinguishing, either as a matter of fact or constitutional law, media corporations from 
corporations such as [the bank].”  He went on to argue that the Press Clause could not 
provide a basis for such a distinction because in his view, the history of the First 
Amendment showed that the Press Clause was not intended to confer any special rights 
on the press.  
The chief justice’s vote was crucial to the Court’s five-member majority.  Justice 
White, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall, thought the statute could be 
upheld without limiting press speech by distinguishing between, on the one hand, the 
press and “corporations formed for the express purpose of advancing certain ideological 
causes,” and on the other, “corporations operated for the purpose of making profits.”21
Justice Rehnquist, also dissenting, suggested a distinction that seemed to be based on 
corporate law rather than the First Amendment.  He said media corporations could be 
distinguished from others, such as the bank, on the ground that when the state charters a 
corporation for the purpose of publishing a newspaper, “it necessarily assumes that the 
corporation is entitled to the liberty of the press essential to the conduct of its business.”  
While that liberty would include the right to endorse a candidate in its editorial columns, 
the newspaper would have no greater right than any other corporation to contribute 






In Austinv. Michigan chamber of Commerce, the problem of distinguishing 
between the press and other corporations arose in a different way.  The nonprofit 
corporation challenging a state statute forbidding corporate contributions to candidates 
claimed, among other things, that the statute’s exemption of news stories, commentary, 
and editorials denied it equal protection.  The Court held that “Although the press’ unique 
societal role may not entitle the press to greater protection under the Constitution [citing 
Bellotti}, it does provide a compelling reason for the state to exempt media corporations 
from the scope of political expenditure limitations.”23
[More on the Federal Election Campaign Act pre-BCRA, and on First 
Amendment jurisprudence thereon pre-McConnell: Buckley, Mass. Citizens for Life, 
Beaumont, National Right to Work, Shrink Missouri Govt] 
[Explanation of the BCRA and analysis of McConnell]
The only significant use of the Press Clause in the McConnell litigation was by a 
group of libertarian litigants that included Congressman Ron Paul, other libertarian party 
candidates, and several nonprofit organizations and political committees.  The Paul 
Plaintiffs, as the Court described them, did not claim to qualify for the news media 
exemptions in the BCRA, which they interpreted as being available only to the 
“institutional” press, but argued that they are press, within the meaning of the Press 
Clause, because they “publish through press releases, unpaid appearances on radio and 
television news, talk, and other shows, through political advertisements in newspapers 
23
 Austin at 668
20
and on radio and television, and through their own outlets – faxes, email, web sites, direct 
mail, newsletters, bumper stickers, video and audio tapes, telephone calls, door-to-door 
campaigning, speeches, debates, and even a syndicated radio show.”
They claimed the restrictions interfered with their ability to function as 
“independent and effective ‘presses’” reporting and commenting on public policy issues, 
campaigns, and candidates.  They argued that the Press Clause creates an absolute 
freedom from licensing, prior restraints, editorial control, forced disclosures, and 
discriminatory economic burdens.  These prohibitions are more sweeping than those of 
the speech clause, they argued, and therefore invalidated many of the BCRA’s 
restrictions without regard to whether those served compelling government interests.   
The Court rejected the argument in a footnote saying simply that “this contention lacks 
merit.”24  Their argument against the section of the statute that increased limits on hard 
money contributions was rejected on the ground that they lacked standing.
IV. Political Speech after McConnell
If and when the hegemony of media political speech that McConnell ratifies is 
challenged, one can envision at least three alternative scenarios.  The key determinant in 
all is whether the Court will hold that media political speech receives more constitutional 
protection than that of other corporate speakers.
24
 698n. 89.  
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Scenario 1:  If the Court decides that the political speech of media is entitled to no 
more protection than that of nonmedia corporations, media power to influence elections 
will exist at the sufferance of Congress.  This is the scenario envisioned by Justice 
Thomas in his McConnell dissent.  He said “Although today’s opinion does not expressly 
strip the press of First Amendment protection, there is no principle of law or logic that 
would prevent the application of the Court’s reasoning in that setting.”25 In his view, 
Congress can have no less power to regulate media political speech than speech of 
nonmedia corporations “because of the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of 
distinguishing, either as a matter of fact or constitutional law, media corporations from 
[nonmedia] corporations.”26
A statutory ban on editorial endorsements would not be the end of freedom as we 
know it.  Telling people how they should vote is not a core function of a free press.  Most 
magazines do not endorse candidates or ballot propositions.  Some newspapers do not, 
and some editors who do have doubts about the propriety of the practice.  Until fairly 
recently, the ability of radio and television stations to endorse candidates was curtailed by 
a requirement that they give the opponent an opportunity to respond.  That rule is no 
longer enforced, but most broadcast outlets still do not endorse candidates.  Restricting 
the right of media corporations to editorialize about elections might be viewed by them as 
an assault on a freedom they have enjoyed since long before the First Amendment as 
adopted, but the dent it would put in the total corpus of media speech about politics 




 740, quoting Burger, C.J., concurring, in Bellotti.
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The problem, of course, is that a prohibition against editorial endorsements only
would be impractical.  It could easily be evaded by clothing the endorsement as 
something else – a commentary, an opinion column, an op-ed piece, or a news analysis.  
If the regulatory target is not only endorsements but also attacks, the problem is even 
greater.  A negative news story may be more effective than an editorial as a tool of 
opposition.  For these reasons, a legislature bent on restricting the political influence of 
media would be unlikely to settle for a ban on editorials.  To make that ban effective, the 
legislation would have to extend to other forms of media political speech, such as 
commentary, analysis, and news coverage.  That would go to the core of freedom of the 
press, and it would be inconsistent with the longstanding understanding that the press 
plays a crucial role in informing the public about matters political. 
This scenario is probably unlikely because of the political power of the media. We 
have seen previously that the media have had considerable success in getting legislatures 
to create entirely new protections for them, in the form of shield statutes and prohibitions 
against newsroom searches.  They might be expected to have at least as much success 
persuading legislatures not to take away longstanding press perquisites such as the right 
to freely cover and comment about elections.  
Political success is rarely complete, however.  Even if the threat of pervasive 
regulation of media political speech is remote, the risk of scattered legislative incursions 
is real.  Legislators have often attempted to regulate particular aspects of media political 
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speech.  State legislatures have attempted to prohibit the publication of falsehoods about 
candidates, give candidates who are attacked in the media a right of reply, prohibit 
unsigned editorials endorsing or opposing candidates, restrict election-day endorsements, 
and prohibit exit polling.  Congress has required broadcasters who provide time to one 
candidate to give an equal opportunity to the opponent and required them to offer reply 
time to the opponents of candidates they endorse or oppose.   Most of these restrictions 
have been held unconstitutional, or have been repealed in the face of constitutional 
objections, but they show that media power does not always forestall legislation 
restricting their political speech.
Unwillingness to give media speech some constitutional preference would very 
likely result at least in occasional and peripheral restrictions on the role of the press in 
politics.  Depending on public sentiment toward the press, the willingness of the press to 
defend itself in legislative battles, and the intensity of legislative zeal to curtail the press’s 
role, the restrictions could be far more serious.
Scenario 2:  The Court might hold that media political speech enjoys more 
constitutional protection than the political speech of corporations. This seems to be the 
scenario envisioned by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist in their McConnell
dissents.   Neither explicitly endorsed a favored constitutional position for the press, but 
both clearly believed that the result of McConnell would be a preferred position for media 
corporations in the political dialogue of the nation.  (De facto only?)  (quotes)
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The Court might attribute the favored treatment of the media to the Press Clause, 
or perhaps to some favored-speaker theory developed under the umbrella of the speech 
clause.  The Court’s history of avoiding reliance on the Press Clause would suggest the 
latter course is likely, but in this instance it is hard to see that anything is gained by it.  In 
previous cases, the strategy of squeezing press claims into a speech clause analysis had 
two advantages.  One, it made the right available to nonpress speakers too.  Second, it 
obviated the need to define the press.  In this context the strategy would have neither of 
those advantages.  It would be necessary to define the class of favored speakers by some 
means even if “the press” is not the defining concept, and the right would be available 
only to those speakers.
Another way of giving preference to media speech without invoking the Press 
Clause would be to hold that the risk of corruption that justified the BCRA’s restriction 
of corporate political speech does not exist, or is not as great, in the case of media speech.  
That argument has already been anticipated, and answered, by Justice Thomas:  
“Candidates can be just as grateful to media companies as they can be to corporations and 
unions.  In terms of the ‘corrosive and distorting effects’ of wealth . . . there is no 
distinction between a media corporation and a nonmedia corporation.”27    The majority 
was not dissuaded in McConnell, however, and it is entirely possible that a future Court 
might decide that a particular restriction on a specific type of media political speech 
presents a sufficiently different balance of interests to be distinguishable from McConnell
on familiar speech clause grounds.
27
 740.  See also Rehnquist, dissenting, 780.
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Preferential treatment of media political speech, however it is accomplished 
doctrinally, would prevent McConnell from being the disaster for freedom of the press 
that Justice Thomas predicted, but it would not be an unmixed blessing, even for the 
media.   A world in which those who enjoy favored status are surrounded by outsiders 
constantly trying to gain admission might threaten, or diminish the value of, perquisites 
that the media presently enjoy.  Corporations that seek to be media for purposes of 
gaining protection for their political speech are likely to also want to share other 
advantages that the press enjoys, such as seats in the press gallery, favorable tax 
treatment, and exemption from financial disclosure requirements.  
More importantly, a wide disparity in political speech rights might create internal 
pressures for the media themselves.  General Electric, a major defense contractor, is 
forbidden, as a result of the BCRA and McConnell, from spending corporate money to 
urge the election of members of Congress who appreciate the need for a well-equipped 
military.  But General Electric also owns NBC and NBC’s 14 network-owned televisions 
stations and three cable networks,28 and those entities are free, legally at least, to use their 
news programs to influence congressional elections any way they choose.  Disney, which 
owns ABC and its 10 television stations, and Viacom, which owns CBS and its 16 
stations, also have many nonmedia interests on behalf of which they seek to influence 
Congress.  The same is true of AOL-Time Warner and other conglomerates that have 
both media and nonmedia interests.
28
 See Who Owns What, cjr.org.
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So far there is little evidence that the conglomerates use their media subsidiaries 
to advance the political interests of the parent corporation.  The managers of the media 
subsidiaries seem to guard their journalistic independence fairly zealously.  Nonetheless, 
one cannot welcome any development that increases the temptation for parent 
corporations to influence the journalistic decisions of their media outlets, or for managers 
of the subsidiaries to serve the political interests of the parents without being told to do 
so.  Creation of a large political advantage for corporations that own media is such a 
development. 
Scenario 3:  In my view, the best post-McConnell course would be one that 
includes elements of both of the preceding scenarios.   If faced with a substantial 
restriction on the political speech of the media, the Court should begin with the course 
suggested by Scenario 2.  However frustrated or disenchanted we may become from time 
to time with the press’s performance of its role in political discussion, that role is too 
important to be left to the mercy of legislatures.  Imagining a world in which political 
discussion is left to the Internet and television commercials should be a sufficient 
reminder of the crucial role that the press plays in questioning, verifying, organizing, 
synthesizing, and condensing the information we rely on in making political decisions.  
Restrictions that seriously interfere with that role ought to be constitutionally forbidden.
That should be accomplished by resurrecting the straight-forward Press Clause 
analysis that the Court articulated in Mills v. Alabama: a major purpose of the First 
Amendment was to protect discussion of matters relating to politics; the Constitution 
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specifically selected the press to play an important role in that discussion; suppression of 
the right of the press to clamor for or against change is “an obvious and flagrant 
abridgement of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press.”29
Attempting to accomplish this without using the Press Clause is not promising.  
Doing it under the speech clause by some sort of ad hoc balancing is too risky.  By their 
nature, controversies over restrictions on political speech will always be fraught with 
political consequences; decisions that turn on assessment of benefits and burdens in 
particular cases will always arouse suspicions of political motives.   Attempting to 
accomplish it under the speech clause by treating the press some sort of favored speaker 
complicates speech clause analysis without avoiding the definitional difficulties that arise 
from reliance on the Press Clause.
In dealing with those definitional questions, the Court should preserve some of 
the legislative autonomy that Scenario 1 envisions.  As I have argued elsewhere,30 the 
Press Clause should not be read as an anti-discrimination clause.  Its purpose is not to 
confer individual rights on everyone who can claim the label “press.”  To paraphrase 
Justice Stewart, its purpose is to protect the full flow of information to the public, and the 
individual rights of particular press claimants are subsumed under that broad societal 
interest.31 This means that the press’s role in political speech can be protected under the 
Press Clause without giving the same rights to everyone who might qualify as press.
29
 219.
30 Freedom of the Press, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 429 (2002).
31
 408 U.S. 726 n. 2.  
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This is a difficult interpretation to accept because it differs so dramatically from 
speech clause jurisprudence, where nondiscrimination among speakers is an article of 
faith.  The marketplace model of free speech is so deeply entrenched that it is unpopular, 
if not unthinkable, to suggest that free speech interests could be served without giving 
everyone the same right to speak.32  But sensible interpretation of the Press Clause begins 
with an understanding that it is different from other Bill of Rights provisions.  As Justice 
Stewart pointed out, most of those protect specific rights of individuals, while the Press 
Clause protects an institution.  That means that a law violates the Press Clause only when 
it compromises the institutional role of the press, not when it merely denies a right to an 
individual member of the press.  A litigant advancing a Press Clause claim should not be 
able to succeed by showing that he or she has been denied a right given to another 
member of the press; success should require a showing that the challenged restriction 
threatens the ability of the press to perform its role.
That, of course, is a hard distinction to maintain.  Only the law’s effects on 
particular components of the press can compromise its ability to carry out its institutional 
role, and only the press entities or individuals who are affected can bring litigation to 
protect the institutional role of the press.   Requiring them to assert and show not merely 
an interference with their own ability to function as press, but also a threat to the press as 
an institution, gives them an unfamiliar burden.  But an interpretation of the Press Clause 
that prevents legislative discrimination among members of the press is unworkable.  The 
32
 Such heresies do occasionally get articulated.  “What is important is not that everything be said, but that 
everything worth saying be heard.”  In a few instances, the Court seems to have actually embraced a First 
Amendment theory based on the need to receive information rather than the right of the speaker to speak.  
See Va. Pharmacy.
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press receives a great deal of favorable treatment by law, and is therefore defined 
legislatively for many different purposes, ranging from access to the White House to tax 
exemption to protection from searches and subpoenas.  An interpretation of the Press 
Clause that created uniform press rights as a matter of constitutional law would inevitably 
interfere, possibly fatally, with the existing universe of nonconstitutional press 
preferences.  
To put that concern into the context of politics in the post-McConnell world, there 
are many different ways of regulating media political speech – by deciding which 
members of the press get to ask questions in political debates, who gets access to 
candidates and incumbents, when election results may be projected, whether a 
“newspaper” is really a campaign flyer.  Constitutional law is not a sufficiently flexible 
mechanism to deal with all such questions.  That is why Congress and the state 
legislatures must retain a great deal of leeway in deciding how, and by whom, the 
institutional role of the press is to be fulfilled.  Ultimately, however, the freedom of the 
press to influence politics must be constitutionally protected.
# #
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